Can the law affect attitudes and behavior in the absence of strict enforcement? Experimental evidence from a child marriage reform in Bangladesh
Outcomes: Child, Early, and Forced Marriage
View SourceKey Social Norms Takeaways
The study shows that formal laws can interact with entrenched social norms in complex and sometimes counterproductive ways. In contexts where child marriage is strongly supported by community norms and customary authorities, stricter laws may trigger backlash rather than compliance. Instead of shifting norms toward delayed marriage, legal changes—especially when perceived as conflicting with tradition—can reinforce existing norms, reduce perceived community support for change, and even accelerate undesirable behaviors. The findings emphasize that social norms, particularly those upheld by family elders and community expectations, can override legal intent when enforcement is weak.
Objectives
The article investigates whether legal reforms can influence attitudes and behaviors related to child marriage in settings with weak enforcement, and examines the mechanisms through which laws interact with social norms, including expressive effects, customary authority responses, and perceptions of enforcement.
Methods
The study combines a theoretical model of marriage decision-making with a randomized field experiment in rural Bangladesh. The experiment used a video-based information intervention to vary exposure to different elements of a new child marriage law. Surveys measured short-term attitudes, perceived social norms (e.g., beliefs about community and elder approval), and longer-term behavioral outcomes (actual marriage decisions). Social norms were captured through self-reported attitudes, beliefs about others’ attitudes, vignette responses, and observed behavioral changes.
Intervention Details
Participants were randomly assigned to watch one of three nearly identical video dramas about adolescent marriage: a control version referencing the old law, a treatment highlighting stricter punishments under the new law, and a second treatment including both stricter punishments and an exception clause allowing underage marriage in certain cases. The intervention also varied whether only mothers or both mothers and family elders received the information, allowing analysis of intra-household norm dynamics.
Results
The intervention produced no positive shift in attitudes toward delaying marriage and, in some cases, worsened perceptions of community support for delaying marriage. Notably, exposure to stricter legal penalties increased the likelihood of early marriage by about 7 percentage points, particularly when influential family members (fathers or elders) were informed. Male respondents reported lower acceptable marriage ages, and perceived approval for delaying marriage declined. The inclusion of the exception clause mitigated but did not reverse these effects.
Conclusions
Legal reforms alone are insufficient—and can be counterproductive—when they conflict with prevailing social norms. The study concludes that laws may fail to generate positive “expressive effects” and instead provoke strategic or normative backlash, especially from customary authorities. Effective policy must therefore align legal changes with community norms or actively engage in norm transformation, rather than relying solely on legislation to shift behavior.
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